NT-6211

Slate card with countdown clock. Air Date: Jan 9th 1974. Title: Haig

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INTERVIEW WITH MOYERS AND HAIG:

Alexander Haig:
I think it's a it's a very important aspect of presidential authority and effectiveness. I think at times it can be at a very low. And the business of government can go on just as it did with Harry Truman, just as it did with Abraham Lincoln in his in his second term. Now, your real question was, how about foreign leaders? How do they perceive this? And have we not reached a point where we may be paying some prices and accepting some risks? And I think I would say perhaps so. I think foreign leaders are in their calculations of American responses, whether they be friend or potential enemy, have got to make an assessment of the viability of the American Chief Executive popularity.

Ocean waves visible in the distance behind evergreen tree branches. WS of a mountain range. San Clemente Compound where Nixon has been vacationing. Referred to as "The Western Whitehouse."

INTERVIEW CONTINUES:

Bill Moyers: General, your whole adult life has been in the military of where orders are given and few questions asked. Now, you're right in the center of politics, which is conciliation, persuasion, trying to convince the other people that that you're right, do you feel out of place?

Alexander Haig 3:14
There are times, Bill, when I do find that some of the style and techniques are different. However, I think in general, the management of large organizations, whether they be military and character, or governmental in character, requires many of the same attributes and techniques and, and tactics. I think many people view the military has been an extremely rigid and formalized way of life in which direct orders are given and never question. And I haven't found this to be true in my background, I think we had the same obligations within military organizations.

Bill Moyers 3:59
Do you think if you had had more exposure to politics or experience in politics, the so called Saturday Night Massacre that I think you use the word Firestorm might have been avoided by an evaluation of the responses to a move that from your particular viewpoint seemed an appropriate move?

Alexander Haig 4:19
Not necessarily, Bill I think the set of circumstances which crystallized during that period, or such that they demanded the the actions in the decisions that were taken now, I'm not giving you value judgments on how we got to the particular juncture which required the actions taken by the President, but I think under any similar circumstances, with or without a more refined political acumen, that the outcome would have been much the same because of the various factors that all crystallized at that particular juncture.

Bill Moyers 5:00
Where you thinking militarily? Or politically at that moment that were you thinking of the consequences in the country of this? Or were you thinking of an instruction that needed to be obeyed and an order that needed to be upheld?

Alexander Haig 5:16
Well, I have to be careful. Your question is somewhat of a leading question. I don't think my thinking was a dominant factor in the, in the set of circumstances you described. And I think, if I ever presume in my current position to be the vicar of the outcome of a particular set of circumstances, that we will be in some trouble. To answer your question again, in more specific terms, my course. I feel, at times very poorly equipped in the political arena, and the purely political arena. This doesn't come from, from a set of mind or a set of ethics or a set of mental processes or a lifestyle of decision making. And that would vary. What it really comes from would be a, a lack of background and knowledge of personalities, institutions, informal lines of, of communication and pressure. These kinds of things, of course, I would be somewhat naive. And I am very sensitive to that.

Bill Moyers 6:31
You've said that politics and soldiering are alike, because each test the man, the politician is tested at the ballot box, and the soldier is tested in combat, and that this really provides an unprecedented and unparalleled test for him. Is politics in the White House combative, now, is there something common in the White House now to to the combat?

Alexander Haig 12:11
Well, I'm not sure that that would be the outcome, I obviously share the your conception of the advantages of being able to continuously communicate with the American people on these issues. After all there, they consider quite rightly, that they have a stake. And as a general rule, I think that's, that's the advantageous way and the effective way to deal with the American people in times of crisis.

Bill Moyers 12:46
For example, general, when Secretary Kissinger was discussing the alert, he said, at the proper moment, I'll be able to tell you, the American people why we issued the orders for an alert. Now a lot of time has passed. And we still don't know what it was, wouldn't the American people be more likely to trust the President's calling an alert, acting decisively if we had the answer to?

Alexander Haig 13:14
Well, I think in the best case, that's that's obviously true. But I'm sure you understand, Bill that when Dr. Kissinger made that statement, he made it after most careful assessment, which was made within the bureaucracy and in consultation with the President, as to what the price of that kind of revelation would would entail. The price, I think, at this juncture to the American people themselves, these the calculations that have to be made to the the atmosphere in which we are dealing today. And, for example, I've always been quite critical of the 1962 missile crisis, not in the context of its conduct, conduct, which I think was superb, but rather in the post mortem period, in which a number of well meaning and enthusiastic presidential supporters portrayed that as a great American victory. Well, that's very act and very compulsion of the American politician here at home, established a vested interest within the Soviet leadership to correct the balance. It had implications to their strategic building program, which we saw through the 60s in which the Soviets move massively. To arrive at a period of real, if not perceived parity with the United States and nuclear systems. It was a driving force the setback of the 62 missile crisis. It also compels Soviet leadership's leadership, I'm sure to calculate that they had an obligation in order to confirm their control and their right to exercise that control in the Soviet state to achieve some victories in return,

Bill Moyers 15:08
are you saying that a president can tell the people too much,

Alexander Haig 15:11
I'm saying that at a given juncture when tensions have brought a situation to a particular outcome, it doesn't necessarily serve the best interest of the people, or peace or the national stability to set about, and lay out all of the considerations which may have led to particularly decisions, if that very act could send in train a series of calculations or attitudes, which in themselves, would upset the very achievement or the very phenomena you were trying to describe? Yes, I think in general, there are times when American leaders had best maintain a degree of secrecy, if you will. And I know that's a tough word in this environment today. But to do so, with the full realization that the act of doing so is going to better serve the purposes for which they have a responsibility to the American people.

Bill Moyers 16:23
Wouldn't the invocation of secrecy, however, be more acceptable if the record prior to it was one of candor is open?

Alexander Haig 16:31
Of course. Now, that's your problem? And that's the question you've asked. And I've, if you translate it to the military ethic, in which people have said, the military leader must say, Do what I say because I say so. I expect no questions. I expect immediate response. That's very applicable to the very question you've asked.

Bill Moyers 16:52
Presidents do that. They say I'm the president, I have the information, believe me?

Bill Moyers 22:17
In 1970, General, I'm not sure you you were there. But in 1970, when Mr. Ford was leading an effort by the party, on the part of conservative Republicans and Dixiecrats to impeach justice Douglas, Mr. Nixon ordered the FBI, the State Department and the IRS to cooperate with the House Judiciary Committee, because he said the executive branch has an obligation to cooperate with the judiciary committee looking into the question of impeachment. Is that a precedent you would accept?

Alexander Haig 22:48
I would be very careful to to avoid the the shoals of your of your questions, though, which is obviously well articulated and carefully structured,

Bill Moyers 22:58
but it's only well articulated because I have the letter that President wrote in 1970. And I'm just wondering, is that a precedent of cooperation by the executive with the a legitimate committee of Congress investigating a very tough, tough issue?

Alexander Haig 23:14
I would prefer to, to hold to what I've just stated, I hope that the special prosecutor will soon conclude his investigations, and make his conclusions public and carry that matter to the courts where necessary. And at that procedure. And the conclusions drawn from that procedure will of course, have a great influence on the ultimate outcome of actions within the Congress. And I think it's best to just let its rest there. For the moment.

Bill Moyers 23:49
When Mr. Haldeman was in the job, you now hold his chief of staff, it was said that the President was isolated and remote and aloof. Now it said that when General Haig is in the same position, Mr. Nixon is still isolated and removed, remote and aloof?

Alexander Haig 24:05
No, I don't accept that. I think I've observed presidents over the past 15 to 20 years. And while they are different in their, in their personalities and their own style and tactics. I think this President has had is much much exposure to his officials. Those who who contribute to his decision making are those who shape his attitudes on given policy issues as any president that I've observed. I think I know generally who gets in to see the President and the more the merrier as far as I'm concerned.

Bill Moyers 24:43
Let me ask you this. How can you build an atmosphere in a White House of mutual trust and respect when there is a precedent for the President and his chief of staff having had the telephones of some of the staff members tapped?

Alexander Haig 25:02
Well, I I think you had to be quite careful about that bill. You lived in an administration where similar things were done. Our

Bill Moyers 25:16
I said, I do not recall ever having President Johnson tap our wires. He called me in and say, Did you leak something? And if I said, Yes, I was in trouble if I said, No, I wasn't in trouble. But I never felt that he was tapping wires.

Alexander Haig 25:31
Well, I think this is a this is an issue in which people have very sharp sensitivities. And I understand that. I think there have been provisions. And in the past, there's been a great deal of so called wiretapping for national security purposes. I think that tapping was justified, so long as it was within the framework of the law. And it was, in the instances you're describing early in the administration, yes. Now, the point I was trying to make was, yet this administration, and our statistics are quite accurate on this done less than that less of that, then had been done in the past.

Bill Moyers 26:15
Do you know for a fact, General Haig, that the phones of White House staff members, in previous administrations were tapped?

Alexander Haig 26:25
I think you had to be very careful in making a statement of that kind. I know, there were national security taps of public officials. And I know the apparatus existed to be able to do that in the past, without being specific.

Bill Moyers 26:45
All I'm getting at is, you know, the country out there is hungry for a climate of trust, and mutual respect and confidence in institutions, including the president. How do you go about doing that? Now? How do you intend to go about doing it as Chief of Staff to the President?

Alexander Haig 27:01
Bill, I think he go about doing it by being sure that the American people know that the chief executive that those of us who are categorized as the bureaucrats, bureaucrats in Washington, are dedicating all of their time and their energy to solving the problems which concern the American people most, both in terms of their own aspirations and well being and family life. And in the broader sense in their ability to, to keep the scourge of war from the American people, and hopefully, from the international scene in its broadest sense. And I think if the American people sense that, I know that they're going to be very satisfied with their, with their leadership.

Bill Moyers 27:45
On that note, General Haig, I'd like to thank you in behalf of public television for spending this time with us. I've been talking with General Alexander Haig, Chief of Staff to President Nixon. I'm Bill Moyers. Until next week, good night.

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